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1. Introduction  
 
There are various aspects of the notion of necessity and its implications for the 
multilayered and idiosyncratic constitutional order of the European Union which are 
worthy of analysis. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 
December 2009, envisages the emergence of a collective sense of belonging by 
imposing duties on Member States in extraordinary circumstances. To that effect, it 
introduces two novel provisions. The first is the solidarity clause in Article 222 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This provides for the joint 
action by the Union and its Member States 'if a Member State is the object of a 
terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster' and requires that the 
Union 'shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military 
resources made available by the Member States'. The second provision is the mutual 
assistance clause in Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) which 
reads as follows:  
 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. 
 
Both clauses raise a host of questions about the nature of the duty they impose on 
Member States, the conditions under which the latter are expected to comply with it, 
and the specific ways in which their compliance is envisaged to manifest itself.  
 
Another aspect of the status of necessity under EU law is how it affects the position of 
Member States as fully sovereign subjects of international law when they act in areas 
of EU competence, or in ways which may affect EU law. It this aspect which will be 
the subject matter of this article, as it relates to the balance of power between Member 
States and the Union within the Union legal order, itself an issue of fundamental 
significance. The Union, as the Community in the pre-Lisbon days, is founded on the 
principle of limited competence. In accordance with Article 5(1)TEU, '[t]he limits of 
Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral' which is defined in 
Article 5(2) TEU:1  
 
... the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States. 
 
                                                 
 Professor of European Union Law and Jean Monnet Professor of European Law, University of 
Bristol. 
1
 In the pre-Lisbon constitutional arrangements, the principle of conferral which governed the 
European Community was set out in Article EC. On the principle of limited competence, see A. 
Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’, (1996) 21 ELRev 113. 
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Therefore, any analysis of the notion of necessity within the Union legal order is 
centered on the locus of power within its constitutional architecture. In terms of the 
semiotics of this architecture, it is noteworthy that, in the Lisbon Treaty, that is the 
most recent expression of the Union's primary charter, provisions on competence start 
off with a reference to the limits of the Union's competences.  
 
This analysis focuses on the effects of the Union legal order on the right of the 
Member to rely upon the concept of necessity, and focuses on the ways in which EU 
law accommodates this right in cases where its exercise deviates from EU law. It is 
structured as follows. First, it examines the provisions set out in the EU Treaties 
which enable Member States to deviate from the four freedoms. Second, it examines 
clauses laid down in secondary measures adopted by the EU institutions which justify 
deviations from their provisions. Third, it analyses the provisions set out in primary 
law which recognise the right of Member States to deviate from the entire corpus of 
EU law under certain extraordinary circumstances. 
 
2. Exceptional clauses in primary law 
 
The Union legal order acknowledges the right of Member States to deal with 
exceptional circumstances by deviating from EU law. It does so by setting out 
exceptional clauses in both primary and secondary legislation. In the context of the 
foundational substantive principles of EU law, that is the four freedoms, such 
exceptions are laid down in Article 36 TFEU regarding free movement of goods,2 
Articles 45(3) TFEU and 52 TFEU regarding free movement of persons,3 and Article 
65 TFEU regarding free movement of capital.4 
 
These provisions enable a Member States to impose restrictions in order to protect 
certain interests which may be in conflict with free movement and which are deemed 
worthy of such exceptional protection. These interests are set out in primary law and 
include, invariably, public policy, public security and public health. They also include 
certain other interests a reference to which may vary in different TFEU provisions.5  
 
In terms of the philosophy of these exceptions, it would be wrong to assume that the 
relevant provisions grant the Member States the right to protect the social interests to 
which they refer by deviating from EU law. Instead, they acknowledge the right 
which each Member State has as a fully sovereign subject of international law to 
protect the social interests deemed more important, in a case of conflict, than the 
economic freedoms set out in the EU Treaties.  
 
On the other hand, it would also be wrong to assume that the Member States enjoy 
complete discretion as to whether and, if so, how to protect these interests. In fact, 
there are certain parameters within which the Member States must act. This may be 
recognized in primary law. Article 36 TFEU, for instance, provides that prohibitions 
or restrictions on the free movement of goods ‘shall not … constitute a means of 
                                                 
2
 ex Art 30 EC. 
3
 ex Articles 39(3) EC and 46 EC. 
4
 ex Article 58 EC. 
5
 For instance, Art. 36 TFEU also refers to public morality, the protection of health and life of animals 
or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, and 
the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
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arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States’. 
Early attempts of Member States to instrumentalise such exceptions in order to escape 
EU law controls were rebuffed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 
Simmenthal, it was made clear that ‘Article [36 TFEU, ex Article 30 EC] is not 
designed to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States but 
permits national laws to derogate from the principle of the free movement of goods to 
the extent to which such derogation is and continues to be justified for the attainment 
of the objectives referred to in that article’.6 
 
Therefore, the interpretation of the exceptional clauses laid down in the EU Treaties 
has been based on the premise that they ‘deal with exceptional cases which are clearly 
defined and which do not lend themselves to any wide interpretation’.7 This tenet 
applies both to principles set out in the EU Treaties8  as well as secondary legislation.9 
In particular, the requirement of compliance with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality has been a constant in the ways in which necessity requires that 
national authorities deviate from EU law provisions.10 Within this context, one of the 
parameters which the Court examines is the existence of secondary legislation and the 
extent to which this protects the interest which a Member State seeks to protect: if the 
answer to this question is affirmative, then the deviation from EU law is not justified 
as, by purporting to protect an interest already protected at EU level, such a deviation 
is no longer necessary. Therefore, not only is the exercise of the right of the Member 
States to act when they deem that necessity so requires assessed in concreto by 
Europe’s judges, but the latter assessment is also carried out in the light of EU law 
and the activities of the EU legislature.  
 
In relation to the public security proviso, in particular, the Court of Justice has 
traditionally afforded some leeway to the Member States. This is exemplified in the 
Campus Oil judgment.11 This preliminary reference was about an Irish rule that 
importers of petroleum products should purchase a certain proportion of their 
requirements from the only State refinery at a fixed price. The Irish Government 
argued that the restriction on free movement of goods which that requirement entailed 
was justified on public security grounds: it was essential that the State should be able 
                                                 
6
 Case 35/76 [1976] ECR 1871, para. 14. See also Case 153/78 Commission v Germany [1979] ECR 
2555, para. 5 
7
 Case 13/68 Salgoil Salgoil SpA vItalian Ministry for Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453, 463, Case 
222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, 
para 26. 
8
 Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paragraphs 27 and 27, Case 46/76 
Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5, paragraph 12, Case C-30/77 R v Boucheraeu [1979] ECR 1999, paragraph 33, 
Case 72/83 Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, Case C-54/99 
Association Église de Scientologie de Paris v The Prime Minister [2000] ECR I-1335, paragraphs 17-
18. 
9
 Case 222/84 Johnston, n7 above, paragraph 36, Case C-116/91 Licensing Authority South Eastern 
Traffic Area v British Gas [1992] ECR I-4071, paragraph 12, Case C-45093 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 3051, paragraph 21, Case C-335/94 Hans Walter Mrozek and 
Bernhard Jäger .[1996] ECR I-1573, para. 9, Case C-321/96 Wilhelm Mecklenburg v Kreis Pinneberg - 
Der Landrat [1998] ECR I-3809, para. 25, Case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and 
Secretary of State for Defence [1999] ECR I-7403, paragraph 23, Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v 
Bundesrepublik Deutchland [2000] ECR I-69, paragraph 22. 
10
 For the application of the principle of proportionality in this context, see T. Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007, 2nd ed.), Ch. 5.  
11
 Case 72/83 Campus Oil, n8 above.   
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to rely upon crude oil at all times, and, to that effect, it ought to ensure the viability of 
the only Irish refinery.  
 
This case illustrates clearly the different interests which underpin the application of 
EU law once a Member States seeks to rely upon the notion of necessity. On the one 
hand, the Court delineates in its judgment the authority of the Member State to act in 
broad terms, so much so that it is prepared to approach the prior intervention by the 
Union legislature in a more flexible manner than its previous case-law might have 
tolerated. It pointed out that the Community had adopted secondary legislation 
dealing with difficulties in supplies of crude oil and petroleum products. However, it 
held that, such measures notwithstanding, the Member States do not have ‘an 
unconditional guarantee that supplies will in any event be maintained at least at a 
level sufficient to meets its minimum needs’.12  
 
It, then, held that an interruption of supply of petroleum products was justifiable 
under the public security exception as such products, ‘because of their exceptional 
importance as an energy source in the modern economy, are of fundamental 
importance for a country’s existence since not only its services but above all its 
institutions, its essential public services and even the survival of its inhabitants 
depend upon them’.13 This approach suggests that, once necessity touches upon the 
most vital interests of the State, and therefore, gives rise to the core of the functions 
which a State carries out in order to protect its citizens, there is more leeway for 
autonomous action, the presence of EU secondary legislation in the area 
notwithstanding. 
 
However, to tolerate and sanction the choices made by the Member States is not 
tantamount to rendering them beyond the Union legal framework altogether. In 
Campus Oil, the Court went on to determine whether the Irish restriction was 
proportionate. It pointed out that the quantities of petroleum products to which the 
purchasing obligation referred should not exceed the minimum supply requirements 
of the State ‘without which the operation of essential public services and the survival 
of its inhabitants would be affected’.14 It is interesting that the Court should engage in 
quite a detailed examination of what the proportionality test would entail: ‘the 
quantities of petroleum products whose marketing can be ensured under such a system 
must not exceed the quantities which are necessary, so far as production is concerned, 
on the one hand, for technical reasons in order that the refinery may operate currently 
art a sufficient level of its production capacity to ensure that its plant will be available 
in the event of a crisis and, on the other hand, in order to that it may continue to refine 
at all times the crude oil covered by the long-term contracts which the State concerned 
has entered into so that it may be assured of regular supplies’.15  
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, para. 31. 
13
 Ibid para 34.  See also Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium (re: golden shares) [2002] ECR I-
4809, para. 46.  
14
 Ibid, para. 47. 
15
 Ibid, para. 48. On the different approaches to the construction of the principle of proportionality by 
the Court in the context of primary free movement exceptional provisions, see C Barnard, 'Derogations, 
Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?' in C Barnard and O Odudu 
(eds), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009) 273. 
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The Court is seen to have taken a ‘pro-state’ approach in Campus Oil.16 However, it is 
not only the detailed analysis and strict application of the principle of 
proportionality17 which may question this view. It is also the clearly narrow terms in 
which the notion of public security was defined. Indeed, the circumstances in which 
the notion of public security as construed by the Court would apply would be truly 
quite exceptional.18 In a subsequent action against Greece,19 the Court was asked to 
deal again with a system of ensuring minimum stock of petroleum products and the 
Community measure already mentioned in Campus Oil which imposed such a 
requirement on Member States.20 The Greek authorities, however, had enabled the 
companies bound to store petroleum products to transfer that obligation to refineries 
based in Greece provided that they had purchased such products from these refineries 
during the previous year. The Court found this provision contrary to the principle of 
free movement of goods: it aimed to protect an interest of an economic nature and, in 
any case, ‘the objective of public security could have been achieved by less restrictive 
measures without it being necessary to make the transfer of the storage obligation to 
refineries established in Greece conditional upon the obligation to obtain supplies of 
petroleum products from those refineries’.21  
 
The judgment in Commission v Greece clearly suggests that the Campus Oil principle 
by no means provides Member States with a carte blanche when they claim that 
necessity related to public security entails a deviation from EU law. In its rather short 
judgment, the Court merely referred to the arguments made by the late Advocate 
General Colomer in his Opinion, without even repeating them. It is interesting that the 
latter had expressed deep skepticism about the Greek arguments, and required a 
detailed and specific explanation of how public security entailed the adoption of the 
illegal measure.22    
 
Viewed along a strict and elaborate approach to the application of the principle of 
proportionality, the judgment in Campus Oil acknowledges the duty of the Member 
States to protect their citizens, whilst subjecting its exercise to Union law control. It is 
noteworthy that the latter is mediated through national courts. In Campus Oil, the 
Court follows a constant theme of its case-law and leaves the application of the 
principle of proportionality to national courts.23 All in all, the judgment is not couched 
in language of deference, but one of balanced coexistence of the rights of Member 
                                                 
16
 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (Oxford: OUP, 2007, 2nd ed.) at 
82. 
17
 See T Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (Oxford: OUP 2007, 2nd ed.) at 226.  
18
 See also P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law (Oxford: OUP 2008, 4th ed.) at 700.  
19
 Case C-398/98 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-7915. 
20
 Council Directive 68/414/EEC of 20 December 1968 imposing an obligation on Member States of 
the EEC to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ, English Special 
Edition 1968 (II), p. 586. 
21
 n8 above, para. 31.  
22
 See, for instance, para. 44 of his Opinion, to which the judgment referred, which reads as follows: 
‘As regards the risk for the distribution system of an industrial unit which is vital for national security, I 
am of the view that the defendant Government has not shown that, in order to protect national security, 
it is essential to link the transfer of the storage to the obligation to acquire the products. I myself see no 
reason why, if under the present system the refineries can store their own products, they cannot, under 
a system governed by the laws of the market and of free competition, store the products which the 
marketing undertakings acquire from other Member States’. 
23In the area of free movement of goods, see M Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National Courts 
(Oxford: OUP, 1998) Chs 6 and 7.  
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States as fully sovereign subjects of international law and the obligations imposed 
under the Community legal order.    
 
So far, this analysis has focused on the interpretation of public security in the context 
of deviations from EU law in cases where Member States deem these necessary. The 
starting point for the tensions described above is the assumption by the Member 
States that there is an area reserved to their sovereign powers the exercise of which 
should be immune from the disciplines imposed by the EU's rules. This assumption 
has manifested itself in different contexts over the years. A striking example was 
provided in the area of sanctions against third countries. In Centro-Com, the British 
Government argued that it reserved the power to deviate from EC rules imposing 
economic sanctions against Serbia in order to ensure their effective application, 
because such a deviation constituted a foreign policy choice which was beyond the 
scope of the Community legal order.24  
 
The Court of Justice accepted that foreign policy was not covered by EC law. 
However, it added that ‘while it is for Member States to adopt measures of foreign 
and security policy in the exercise of their national competence, those measures must 
nevertheless respect the provisions adopted by the Community in the field of the 
common commercial policy provided for by Article [207 TFEU, ex Article 133] of 
the Treaty’.25 The same conclusion was reached in relation to similar claims for 
reserved powers in the areas of monetary powers,26 registration of vessels,27 social 
policy,28 taxation,29 health care,30 and services liberalisation.31 This case-law, and the 
need for Member States to take into account the law of the European Union when the 
policy choices which they deem necessary deviate from EU law have prompted a 
sitting Judge at the Court of Justice, writing in an extra-judicial capacity, to argue that 
‘[t]here is no nucleus of sovereignty that Member States can invoke as such against 
the Community’.32 
 
3. Exceptional clauses in secondary law 
 
Provisions similar to the primary exceptional clauses mentioned above are also laid 
down in secondary EU legislation. For instance, Council Regulation 3285/94 on 
                                                 
24
 Case C-124/95 Centro-Com [1997] ECR I-81. 
25Ibid, paragraph 27.  
26
 See Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523, paragraph 17, Case 57/86 
Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, paragraph 9, Case 127/87 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 
3333, paragraph 7. 
27
 Case C-221/89 Factortame and Others [1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 14. 
28
 C-438/05 The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union  [2007] 
ECR I-10779, paragraph 40. 
29
 Case C-264/96 ICI v Colmer  [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 19, Case C‑334/02 Commission v 
France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraph 21, Case C 446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I 10837, 
paragraph 29, and Case C 524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group litigation [2007] ECR I 2107, 
paragraph 25. 
30
 Case C‑120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I‑1831, paragraphs 22 and 23, Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] 
ECR I‑1931, paragraphs 18 and 19, Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraph 
46. 
31
 Case C-475/98 Commission v Austria  [2002] ECR I-9797, paragraph 132. 
32
 K Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism’, 38 American Journal of 
Comparative law (1990) 205 at p 220.  
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imports from third countries enable Member States to deviate from its provisions and 
impose prohibitions, quantitative restrictions or surveillance measures on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property.33 Similar provisions are set out in other EU instruments, and they refer to 
such non-economic interests either expressly,34 or by reference to the exceptional 
clauses set out in the E Treaties.35  Furthermore, there may be special exclusions 
depending on the subject-matter of the set of rules in question.36 
 
In its interpretation of such clauses, the Court has adopted the balanced approach 
which underpins its judgment in Campus Oil. This has become apparent in the area of 
export controls, and in particular their application to dual-use goods, that is goods of 
both civil and military application. This area provided scope for considerable debate 
between the Commission and the Member States. The former argued that, as exports 
are trade measures, exports of dual-use goods fell within the scope of Community law 
pursuant to ex Article 133 EC (now Article 207 TFEU). The implications of this 
position would be considerable: this central provision of the Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP) had long been held by the Court to confer upon the Community  (now 
the Union) exclusive competence, hence allowing Member States to act on their own 
only on the basis of a specific EU law authorization.37 On the other hand, the Member 
States argued that, because of their nature, exports of dual-use goods fell within the 
sphere of foreign and security policy and, as such, could not be subject to the 
principles of EU law in general and CCP in particular.38    
 
In its case law, the Court of Justice struck the balance between these differing 
approaches. On the one hand, it made it clear that the foreign implications of the 
national measures would not render them immune to EC law control. In Leifer, it held 
as follows:39 
 
                                                 
33
 Council Regulation 3285/94 [1994] OJ L 275/1, Art. 24(2)(a)(i). 
34
 For instance, Council Regulation 2603/69 on common rules on exports [1969] OJ L 324/25,amended 
by Regulation 3918/91, [1991] OJ L 372/31 (Art. 11). 
35
 See, for instance, Council Regulation 227/77 on Community transit [1977] OJ L 38/1, Art. 10 as 
interpreted by the Court in Case C-367/89 Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les 
Accessoires Scientifiques SNC [1991] ECR I-4621, paras 17-18. 
36
 See, for instance, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114, Art. 14 on 
secret contracts and contracts requiring special security measures/ However, there is also a provision in 
the preamble (para. 6) according to which ‘[n]othing in this Directive should prevent the imposition or 
enforcement of measures necessary to protect public policy, public morality, public security, health, 
human and animal life or the preservation of plant life, in particular with a view to sustainable 
development, provided that these measures are in conformity with the Treaty’. 
37
 For the early authorities, see Opinion 1/75 (re: OECD Local Cost Standard) [1975] ECR 1355, Case 
41/76 Donckerwolke [1976] ECR 1921, Opinion 1/78 (re: International Agreement on Natural Rubber) 
[1979] ECR 2781, Case 174/84 Bulk Oil [1986] ECR 559. For an analysis, and references to more 
recent case law, see P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2004) pp 9 
et seq, and P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006) pp1 et seq  
38
 For an analysis of this debate, see P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001)   
39
 Case C-83/94 Criminal Proceedings against Peter Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231, paras 10-
11. See also Case C-70/94 Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany 
[1995] ECR I-3189, paras 10-11.  
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… national rules whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain products fall 
within the scope of the common commercial policy within the meaning of Article [133] of the 
Treaty.  
 
The fact that the restriction concerns dual-use goods does not affect that conclusion. The 
nature of those products cannot take them outside the scope of the common commercial 
policy. 
 
Therefore, the Court refuses to delineate an area where reliance upon necessity would 
enable Member States to act wholly independently from EU law. As national action is 
viewed as within the scope of EU law, the Court, then, deals with the question 
whether a national restriction on exports may be justified as necessary to protect 
public security. It answers in the affirmative, and construes the latter concept widely, 
encompassing both internal and external security.40 In doing so, the Court construes 
the scope for Member States to act in wide terms too. In Leifer it accepts that,41  
 
… depending on the circumstances, the competent national authorities have a certain degree 
of discretion when adopting measures which they consider to be necessary in order to 
guarantee public security in a Member State within the meaning indicated above. When the 
export of dual-use goods involves a threat to the public security of a Member State, those 
measures may include a requirement that an applicant for an export licence show that the 
goods are for civil use and also, having regard to specific circumstances such as inter alia the 
political situation in the country of destination, that a licence be refused if those goods are 
objectively suitable for military use. 
 
Consistently with settled case-law, it is for national courts to ascertain whether the 
national measures are necessary and proportionate. In doing so, they must take into 
account the discretion which the Court of Justice acknowledges that national 
authorities enjoy.  
 
This balance between what the Member States may do when they deem it necessary, 
and what EU law requires them to do in order to comply with its principles is not 
always easy to strike. In the area of exports of dual-use goods, for instance, the 
Council adopted in 1994 a set of rules which combined a EC law measure and a CFSP 
common position: the former introduced a cautious version of the principle of mutual 
recognition whereby the competent national authorities would have the right to refuse 
to grant export authorisations if they deemed that to do otherwise would undermine a 
set of specific principles related, amongst others, to arms embargoes and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the latter laid down these principles, 
hence providing the modus operandi of the EC measure, along with the scope of 
products whose exports were subject to the latter measure.42 However, following the 
Werner and Leifer case-law, it became clear that these rules were contrary to EU law. 
                                                 
40
 See Case C-367/89 Richardt, n35 above, para. 22, Case C-83/94 Leifer, n39 above, para. 26, Case 
70/94 Werner, n39 above, paras 25-27 In the latter case, and with reference to German legislation on 
external trade, the Court accepts that public security would be undermined by the risk of serious 
disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations (para. 27).  
41
 Ibid, para. 35.  
42
 See Council Regulation 3381/94 setting up common rules on exports of dual-use goods [1994] O.J. L 
367/1 and Decision 94/942/CFSP, [1994] OJ L 367/8. For a critical analysis of these rules, see P 
Koutrakos, 'Exports of Dual-Use Goods under the Law of the European Union', (1998) 23 ELRev 235. 
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The Council duly amended them and set out common rules in a single EU law 
instrument which refers to the Court's case-law expressly in its preamble.43  
 
4. Wholly exceptional clauses  
 
The above analysis dealt with the extent to which the Union legal order enables 
Member States to deviate when they deem it necessary. The exceptional clauses 
examined above enable national authorities to deviate from specific EU law principles 
and rules provided that certain conditions are met. However, there are two further 
clauses in primary law which are defined as ‘wholly exceptional’44 for two reasons: 
on the one hand, there is no limit to the type of measure which a Member State may 
adopt and, on the other hand, in adopting such a measure, the State in question may 
deviate from the entire body of EU law.  
 
These provisions are laid down in Articles 346 TFEU (ex Article 296 EC) and 347 
TFEU (ex Article 297 EC). The former is about trade in and production of arms, 
munitions and war materials, and the latter is about extraordinary circumstances 
related to national and international security.  
 
4.1. Article 347 TFEU  
 
Article 347 TFEU (ex Article 297 TEU) reads as follows: 
 
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to 
prevent the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a Member 
State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the 
maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international tension constituting a 
threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of 
maintaining peace and international security. 
 
The poor drafting of the above provision is striking.45 The reference, first, to the 
consultation amongst Member States and then to the national deviation from EU law, 
as well as the use of the term ‘called upon’ may suggest that, rather than conferring a 
right upon them, Article 347 TFEU acknowledges the inherent duty of the Member 
States to act as fully sovereign subjects of international law. After all, the four sets of 
circumstances mentioned therein under which Member States may deviate from the 
entire corpus of EU law are exceptional in their significance and touch upon the very 
core of the function of the State and, therefore, the latter’s sovereignty. That they 
render the action of the State necessary hardly seems worthy of further analysis. 
                                                 
43
 Council Regulation 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
items and technology, [2000] L 159/1, amended a number of times and repealed recently by Council 
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use goods, see A Dashwood, 'Dual-use Goods: (Mis)Understanding Werner and Leifer ' in A Arnull, P 
Eeckhout and T Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law - Essays in Honour of Sir Francis 
Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 354. 
44
 Case 222/84 Johnston, n9 above, para. 27. See also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-120/94 
Commission v Greece (re: FYROM) at para. 46.  
45
 For an analysis of ex Article 297 EC, see P Koutrakos, ‘Is Article 297 EC “a reserve of 
sovereignty”?’, (2000) 37 CMLRev 1339, and C Stefanou and H Xanthaki, A Legal and Political 
Interpretation of Articles 224 and 225 of the Treaty of Rome: The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Cases (Aldershot: Dartmouth and Ashgate, 1997).  
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However, the wholly exceptional nature of the circumstances which may necessitate 
national action and its implications notwithstanding, Article 347 TFEU clearly sets 
out certain parameters within which the Member State are expected to act. These may 
be divided in three categories. The first consists of substantive conditions: it is only in 
the circumstances laid down therein that a Member State may deviate from EU law. 
The second is procedural: the Member State which would deem it necessary to act in 
such circumstances should consult with other Member States in order to adopt a 
common approach aiming to protect the internal market. There is also another 
dimension in this which involves the Commission. According to Article 348 
subparagraph 1 TFEU (ex 298 subparagraph 1 EC),  
 
If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 346 and 347 have the effect of 
distorting the conditions of competition in the internal market, the Commission shall, together 
with the State concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down 
in the Treaties. 
 
The above are duties imposed under primary law, and the Member States are bound 
by the duty of cooperation which is set out in Article 4(3) TEU in terms more 
elaborate than in the previous constitutional arrangements:  
 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in 
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union. 
 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives. 
 
The conditions set out in Article 347 TFEU and implied by the duty of cooperation  
are not the only reminders that the wholly exceptional role of Member States should 
be carried out within EU law parameters. Article 348 subparagraph 2 TFEU (ex 
Article 298 subparagaph 2 EC) sets out an extraordinary procedure for judicial 
review. It reads as follows:  
 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 259, the Commission 
or any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers 
that another Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 346 
and 347. The Court of Justice shall give its ruling in camera. 
 
It follows from the above that quite what it is that necessity makes Member States 
choose to do and under which conditions may not be dissociated from the Union legal 
order even in cases of extraordinary seriousness. This is entirely consistent with the 
picture which emerged from the analysis of the exceptional clauses set out in primary 
and secondary Union law. However, the ‘wholly exceptional’ nature of the 
circumstances set out in Article 347 TFEU and the Article 348 TFEU procedure raise 
questions about the enforcement of the EU law conditions outlined above. What is the 
level of supervision which the Commission and the Member States are prepared to 
exercise? What is the intensity of control which the Court of Justice deems 
appropriate? To what extent are Member States free to determine how best to respond 
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to what they deem to be a serious threat to their ability to protect their citizens and 
their duty to protect their, as well as the international, security?  
 
The record and the practice of the relevant actors so far, or rather the lack thereof, 
only allude to the answer to this question: there has only been one action brought 
against a Member State under Article 298 EC. Given the maturity of the Union legal 
order, this suggests reluctance by both the Commission and Member States to 
challenge choices made by a State in circumstances which the latter deems 
exceptional. This case was Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece (re: FYROM) the 
subject-matter of which was the embargo imposed by Greece against FYROM 
(Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).46 The Commission alleged a violation of 
ex Article 297 EC (now Article 347 TFEU). The Court delivered no judgment on this 
case, as the embargo was lifted and the Commission withdrew the action early 
enough. However, Advocate General Jacobs delivered an Opinion which touched 
upon the most central issues raised when a State deems that a deviation from EU law 
is necessary in order to protect vital interests.   
 
In his Opinion, he analyses the relevant issues with considerable clarity, detachment, 
and subtlety. Whilst he affirms the existence of the role of both Community 
supervision by the Commission and judicial review by the Court in the areas dealt 
with under ex Articles 297 EC and 298 EC (now Articles 347 and 348 TFEU), he 
points out that the ‘scope and intensity of the review that can be exercised by the 
Court is …. severely limited on account of the nature of the issues raised’ and 
continued as follows:47 
 
There is a paucity of judicially applicable criteria that would permit this Court, or any other 
court, to determine whether serious international tension exists and whether such tension 
constitutes a threat of war. The nature of the problem is encapsulated in remarks made by an 
English judge in a rather different context: ‘there are … no judicial or manageable standards 
by which to judge these issues, or to adopt another phrase … the court would be in a judicial 
no-man’s land’.  
 
Therefore, given ‘the extremely limited nature of the judicial review that may be 
carried out in this area’,48 he confines it, in essence, to determining whether reliance 
upon ex Article 297 EC (now Article 347 TFEU) involves manifest errors or abuse of 
power. He argued that ‘the question must be judged from the point of view of the 
Member State concerned’ and elaborated as follows:49  
 
Because of differences of geography and history each of the Member States has its own 
specific problems and preoccupations in the field of foreign and security policy. Each 
Member State is better placed than the Community institutions or the other Member States 
when it is a question of weighing up the dangers posed for it by the conduct of a third State. 
Security is, moreover, a matter of perception rather than hard fact. What one Member State 
perceives as an immediate threat to its external security may strike another Member State as 
relatively harmless. 
 
                                                 
46
 [1996] ECR I-1513. 
47
 Ibid, para. 50. 
48
 Ibid, para. 60.  
49
 Ibid, para. 54.  
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Examining whether ‘in the light of all the circumstances, including the geopolitical 
and historical background, Greece could have had some basis for considering, from its 
own subjective point of view, that the strained relations between itself and FYROM 
could degenerate into armed conflict’,50 he concludes as follows:51    
 
I do not think that it can be said that Greece is acting wholly unreasonably… even if [the 
threat of war] may be long-term and remote….  
 
The very careful wording of this conclusion is noteworthy,52 as is the absence of any 
reference to the procedural aspects of ex Article 297 EC (now Article 347 TFEU) and 
the failure by Greece to comply with them.53 The latter notwithstanding, the analysis 
put forward by Advocate General Jacobs, and the issues which it tackles, is linked to 
the overview of the construction of ‘necessity’ and its implications by the Court of 
Justice in relation to the exceptional clauses in primary law. They both suggest a 
nuanced and balanced approach to the tensions between State sovereignty and the 
Union legal order, judicial supervision and discretion enjoyed by the executive: the 
rejection of any claim by the Member States to a domaine reservé is accompanied by 
an acknowledgment of their discretion to determine how best to protect their security; 
the requirement that reliance upon the notion of necessity, purported to justify a 
national deviation from EU law, be subject to EU control is followed by an 
understanding of this notion in sufficiently broad terms to accommodate national 
concerns; the full application of EU control mechanisms entails the active 
involvement of national courts which are entrusted with the application of the 
principle of proportionality.  
 
It becomes apparent that the management of necessity by Member States within the 
parameters set by the Union legal order does not lend itself to the convenience of a 
straightforward assessment: it requires a careful balancing exercise between differing 
interests, it is based on the application of general principles on the basis of quite 
specific, and often difficult to assess, circumstances, and involves the interaction of a 
range of actors. This multilayered system has no place for maximalistic positions 
which would either render EU law inapplicable and the role of Member States 
immune to EU control, or would dictate an uncompromising application of EU 
mechanisms with no regard for the specific challenges that necessity raises for 
national authorities.  
 
However, the range of options which may be taken in between these two extremes is 
infinite, as the criteria against which necessity is measured are inherently 
indeterminate. Similarly, the role of the Union institutions (legislature, executive, 
judiciary) in this balancing exercise is far from straightforward and may evolve over 




 Ibid, para, 56.  
52
 Further in his Opinion, AG Jacobs points out that ‘what matters is not so much that Greece’s fears 
may be unfounded but rather that those fears appear to be genuinely and firmly held by the Greek 
Government and, it would appear, by the bulk of the Greek people. Where a government and a people 
are fervently convinced that a foreign State is usurping a part of their cultural patrimony and has long-
term designs on a part of their national territory, it would be difficult to say that war is such an unlikely 
hypothesis that the threat of war can be excluded altogether. If such matters were to be judged 
exclusively by what external observers regarded as reasonable behaviour, wars might never occur’ 
(para. 58). 
53
 See the criticism in Koutrakos, n45 above, at 1356-1359. 
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time pursuant to their interactions with national authorities. The remaining part of this 
analysis will examine how these have evolved in the context of trade in and 
production of armaments, munitions, and war material.  
 
4.2. Article 346 TFEU54 
 
Article 346 TFEU reads as follows:  
 
1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules: 
 
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of 
the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in 
arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of 
competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes. 
 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes 
to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of 
paragraph 1(b) apply. 
 
For a long time, this rather obscure provision of the EU Treaty was viewed as placing 
defence industries beyond the reach of EU law entirely. A broad interpretation of its 
wording was used to substantiate this: on the one hand, the scope of products which 
fell within the scope of Article 346 TFEU was viewed as potentially unlimited; on the 
other hand, the circumstances under which Member States could deviate from EU law 
were ignored or viewed as merely indicative of the general status of the defence 
industries as directly linked to national sovereignty. Therefore, the Member States 
were only too keen to presume that measures regulating their defence industries 
would be beyond the scope of EU law.55 This approach was tolerated by the EU 
institutions.56 It is interesting that the European Parliament confined itself to arguing 
regularly for the deletion of Article 346 TFEU,57 as if that would not be the only way 
for preventing the erroneous and misguided interpretation of its proviso. The elusive 
character of the list mentioned in Article 346 (2) TFEU did not help either: it was only 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union forty three years following 
its adoption in a response by the Commission to a question by the European 
Parliament.58 
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However, a careful reading of Article 346 TFEU suggests that this approach is wrong. 
First, the proviso of Article 347 TFEU is confined to the products which are described 
in the list mentioned in Article 346(2) TFEU. Therefore, the reference  to ‘the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’ was not envisaged as an 
open-ended category of products. This suggests that at no point was it envisaged that 
dual-use goods, that is products which may be of both civil and military application 
should be regulated by national measures deviating from the entire body of EU law. 
Such an argument is supported both by the content of the list mentioned in Article 
346(2) TFEU, and the reference to the effects that such measures should not have on 
‘products which are not intended for specifically military purposes’ in Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU. 
 
Second, measures adopted by a Member State under Article 346 TFEU are not ipso 
facto justified; instead, the deviation from EU law which they entail must be 
‘necessary for the protection of the essential interests of [national] security’. This is 
quite an emphatic statement that, rather than being merely a public security clause,  
Article 346(b) EC should be invoked only when the protection of the core of national 
sovereignty is at stake. 
 
Third, any reliance upon Article 346 EC should take into account the effects which its 
deviation from EU law may have on the status and movement of other products which 
fall beyond its rather narrow scope. In effect, this provision suggests that national 
measures deviating from EU law as a whole should not be adopted in a legal vacuum. 
Instead, Member States are under a duty to consider the implications that such 
measures may have for the common market. 
 
Fourth, Article 348(1) TFEU provides for the involvement of the Commission in 
cases where reliance upon Article 346 TFEU by a Member State would lead to 
distortions of competition. This provision should be interpreted in the light of the duty 
of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU (ex Article 10 EC). In other words, 
a Member State invoking Article 346 TFEU is under a legal duty to cooperate with 
the Commission in order to adjust any ensuing distortions of competition to the EU 
law. 
 
Finally, any deviation from EU law under Article 346 TFEU is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The reference to the ‘improper use of the powers 
provided for in Article … 346’ in Article 348(2) TFEU refers both to the substantive 
conditions which need to be met by a Member State invoking Article 346 TFEU 
(namely those regarding its scope of application, the assessment of ‘essential interests 
of security’) and the procedural ones (that is the duty to cooperate with the 
Commission inferred from Article 348(1) TFEU). 
 
It follows from the above that, according to a strict reading of Articles 346 TFEU and 
348 TFEU, Member States may regulate their defence industries by deviating from 
EU law only in so far as such a deviation is confined to a specific class of products, is 
exercised in accordance with certain principles, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice to ascertain whether it amounts to an abuse of power.  
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This interpretation has gradually been accepted as a matter of EU law. This has been 
due to a variety of factors, three of which are particularly significant, namely the case-
law of the Court of Justice, the considerable structural and financial difficulties of the 
defence industries since the 1990s, and the emerging political climate in the EU which 
is marked by the development of the European Security and Defence Policy.  
 
4.2.1. The case-law 
 
In its first judgment on the applicability of ex Article 296 EC (new Article 346 
TFEU), the Court of Justice left no doubt as to the strict interpretation of this 
provision. In Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain,59 the Court dealt with Spanish 
legislation exempting from VAT intra-Community imports and acquisitions of arms, 
munitions and equipment exclusively for military use. The Sixth VAT Directive 
excluded aircraft and warships. The action against Spain was brought because the 
relevant Spanish rules also covered an additional range of defence products. The 
Spanish Government argued that a VAT exemption for armaments constituted a 
necessary measure for the purposes of guaranteeing the achievement of the essential 
objectives of its overall strategic plan and, in particular, to ensure the effectiveness of 
the Spanish armed forces both in national defence and as part of NATO. 
 
In its judgment, the Court ruled as follows:60 
 
Spain has not demonstrated that the exemptions provided for by the Spanish Law are 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security. It is clear from the 
preamble to [the relevant national] Law that its principal objective is to determine and 
allocate the financial resources for the reinforcement and modernization of the Spanish armed 
forces by laying the economic and financial basis for its overall strategic plan. It follows that 
the VAT exemptions are not necessary in order to achieve the objective of protecting the 
essential interests of the security of the Kingdom of Spain. 
 
It, then, concluded that:61 
 
the imposition of VAT on imports and acquisitions of armaments would not compromise that 
objective since the income from payment of VAT on the transactions in question would flow 
into the State’s coffers apart from a small percentage which would be diverted to the 
Community as own resources. 
 
This suggests a robust approach which, rather than viewing Article 346 TFEU as a 
carte blanche for Member States in the area of defence industries, requires that the 
Member States substantiate how the deviation from EU law they deem necessary 
meets the substantive conditions set out in primary law. This approach was adopted 
four years later by the Court of First Instance, 62 and was reaffirmed by the Court of 
Justice more recently in Case C-337/05 Commission v. Italy,63 and Case C-157/06 
Commission v. Italy.64  
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These cases were about the purchase of Augusta helicopters for the use of police 
forces and the national fire service by a negotiated procedure in contravention of EC 
public procurement legislation which provided for a competitive tendering 
procedure.65 This was a long-standing practice in Italy, and the Government did not 
contest that the helicopters in question were clearly for civilian use, and that their 
military use was only potential. 
 
Both cases are about the same practice and raise the same issues. This analysis will 
focus on Case C-337/05 where the judgment was rendered by the Grand Chamber. 
The Court first reaffirmed the strict interpretation of the exceptional clauses set out in 
the Treaties:66 
 
It cannot be inferred from those articles that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception 
excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. 
The recognition of the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements 
laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to impair the binding nature of Community law and 
its uniform application 
 
It then pointed out that67  
 
It is clear from the wording of that provision that the products in question must be intended 
for specifically military purposes. It follows that the purchase of equipment, the use of which 
for military purposes is hardly certain, must necessarily comply with the rules governing the 
award of public contracts. The supply of helicopters to military corps for the purpose of 
civilian use must comply with those same rules. 
 
The argument of the Italian Government that a deviation from the EC public 
procurement rules was necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of information 
about the production of the  purchased helicopters was dismissed by the Court as 
disproportionate. It was pointed out that no reasons were presented to justify why the 
confidentiality of the information communicated for the production of the helicopters 
manufactured by Agusta would be less well guaranteed were such production 
entrusted to other companies, in Italy or in other Member States.68 
 
The Court was no more sympathetic to the final arguments by the Italian Government 
that, because of their technical specificity, the manufacture of the helicopters in 
question could be entrusted only to Agusta, and that it was necessary to ensure the 
interoperability of its fleet of helicopters, in order, particularly, to reduce the logistic, 
operational and pilot-training costs. It responded as follows:69  
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In this case, the Italian Republic has not discharged the burden of proof as regards the reason 
for which only helicopters produced by Agusta would be endowed with the requisite technical 
specificities. In addition, that Member State has confined itself to pointing out the advantages 
of the interoperability of the helicopters used by its various corps. It has not however 
demonstrated in what respect a change of supplier would have constrained it to acquire 
material manufactured according to a different technique likely to result in incompatibility or 
disproportionate technical difficulties in operation and maintenance. 
 
The recent case-law of the Court of Justice makes it clear that reliance upon the 
notion of necessity may not justify ipso facto any deviation from EU rules. It is not 
only the subject-matter of these cases, that is an area long viewed as within the a 
twilight zone between EU law and national sovereignty, which makes the above 
rulings noteworthy. It is also the rigour with which the Court responded to the vague 
arguments put forward by the national Governments. Member States are not required 
to explain what it is precisely which necessitates a deviation from an EU rule.  
 
However, it would be wrong to assume that the Court has expressed its willingness to 
meddle with the substantive policy choices made by the Member States in areas 
which are close to the core of national sovereignty. Indeed, the above rulings should 
be viewed in their context. In the actions against Italy, for instance, the defences put 
forward by the Italian government were staggering in their generality and the absence 
of any specific argument whatever which would substantiate, even remotely, their 
decision. Furthermore, the remoteness between the subject-matter of the action and 
the scope of Article 346 TFEU was not contested even by the Italian Government. 
After all, the helicopters were envisaged for the use of forces such as the Corps of 
Fire Brigades, the Carabinieri, the Coastguard, the Guardia di Finanza Revenue Guard 
Corps, the State Police and the Department of Civil Protection in the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers. Put differently, the cases on which the Court has rendered 
the above rulings were about egregious violations of both the wording and spirit of 
Article 346 TFEU which exemplified the presumption, widely held by Member 
States, that primary law granted them une carte blanche in the area. It by no means 
follow that the Court would adopt an intrusive and activist approach once substantive 
policy choices are explained properly in relation to the requirements set out in Article 
346 TFEU.  
 
4.2.2. The problems facing the defence industries  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the defence industries in the Member States 
suffered from considerable financial and structural problems, such as fragmentation 
and divergence of capabilities, excess production capability in certain areas and 
shortages in others, duplication, short production runs, reduced budgetary resources, 
and failure to engage in increasingly costly research.70 This highly fragmented state 
gave rise to a number of initiatives, originating in both industry and State bodies, to 
achieve a degree of convergence which would enhance the competitiveness of the 
European defence industries. 
 
                                                 
70
 See, amongst others, A Georgopoulos, ‘The European Armaments Policy: A conditio sine qua non 
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Furthermore, the European Union has gradually placed greater emphasis on its 
Security and Defence Policy. Since 1998, considerable time and energy has been 
spent on establishing institutions, setting out strategies, and consolidating structures in 
ways which would enhance the Union's international role. In this context, the 
European Security Strategy which defines the strategic priorities for the European 
Union sets out the latter's ambition for '[a]n active and capable European Union 
[which] would make an impact on a global scale'71 in terms of “shar[ing] in 
theresponsibility for global security'.72 A number of ESDP missions has been 
undertaken, some of them well beyond Europe's borders, their range covering military 
and police operations, rule of law, border monitoring, and security sector.73 Finally, 
the Lisbon Treaty places greater emphasis on the security and defence policy.74 
 
The development of the European Security and Defence Policy has placed defence 
capabilities at the core of any debate about the Union's international role. It is 
noteworthy that first the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, and now the 
Lisbon Treaty provide for the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA), 
which75  
 
shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, 
shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to 
strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in 
defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in 
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. 
 
It is indicative of the significance attached by the Member States to the issue of 
military capabilities that the EDA should have been established before the 
Constitutional Treaty was even signed.76 In the context of this analysis, a noteworthy 
achievement is the adoption by EDA in November 2005 of a voluntary code on 
defence procurement. This entered into force on 1 July 2006 and applies to contracts 
worth more than €1m which are covered by Article 346 TFEU.77 This sets out to 
establish a single online portal, provided by the EDA, which would publicise 
procurement opportunities. It is based on objective award criteria based on the most 
economically advantageous solution for the particular requirement. Furthermore, it 
provides for debriefing, whereby all unsuccessful bidders who so request will be 
given feedback after the contract is awarded. The regime provides for exceptions for 
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reasons of pressing operational urgency, follow-on work or supplementary goods and 
services, and extraordinary and compelling reasons of national security. 
 
All these developments have gradually rendered defence industries at the centre of the 
attention of both the Union and its Member States. It is in this context that 
considerable developments have take place under EU law.  
 
4.2.3. Interpretative and legislative initiatives by EU institutions 
 
In December 2006, the European Commission put forward its view as to the proper 
interpretation of Article 346 TFEU, and expressed its intention to enforce it rigorously 
by enforcement proceedings before the Court of Justice.78 The aim of the document is 
'to prevent possible misinterpretation and misuse of Article 296 EC in the field of 
defence procurement' and 'give contract awarding authorities some guidance for their 
assessment whether the use of the exemption is justified'.79 
 
The Commission draws upon the wording of Article 346 TFEU80 and the case-law of 
the EU Courts and states that 'both the field of and the conditions of application of  
Article [346 TFEU] must be interpreted in a restrictive way'. It acknowledges the 
wide discretion granted to a Member State in order to determine whether its essential 
security interests ought to be protected by deviating from EC law. However, this 
discretion is not unfettered. To that effect, it is argued that any interests other than 
security ones, such as industrial or economic, cannot justify recourse to Article 346 
TFEU even if they are connected with the production of and trade in arms, munitions 
and war material.  
 
In relation to the role of the Member States, the Commission states that81  
 
... the Member States’ prerogative to define their essential security interests and their duty to 
protect them. The concept of essential security interests gives them flexibility in the choice of 
measure to protect those interests, but also a special responsibility to respect their Treaty 
obligations and not to abuse this flexibility. 
 
What are the implications of this approach in the area which has given rise to most of 
the cases before the Court, namely public procurement? According to the 
Commission,82  
 
the only way for Member States to reconcile their prerogatives in the field of security with 
their Treaty obligations is to assess with great care for each procurement contract whether an 
exemption from Community rules is justified or not. Such case-by-case assessment must be 
particularly rigorous at the borderline of Article 296 EC where the use of the exemption may 
be controversial. 
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In its initiative, the Commission makes a declaration of intent: national measures 
governing the defence industries would no longer be viewed as inherently above EU 
law, and any deviations from the Treaties would be pursued before the Court of 
Justice. In terms of the substance of its construction of Article 346 TFEU, there is 
nothing in the Communication which is revolutionary or which does not originate in 
the previous, albeit limited, case-law or the wording of the above provision. In 
declaring its intention to no longer tolerate violations of EU law based on an 
expansive interpretation of Article 346 TFEU, the Commission seeks to strike the 
balance between the leeway which national authorities are endowed when dealing 
with matters close to the core of national sovereignty, and the requirements set out by 
EU law in order to ensure that no abuse of this leeway occurs. In this context, it is 
interesting that it should also engage in adjusting the list mentioned in Article 346 (2) 
TFEU in a rather creative manner.83  More importantly, one of the main tenets of the 
Communication is the acknowledgment by the Commission of the prerogative of the 
Member States to define their essential security interests. It is interesting, however, 
that it should shy away from developing this point further, and elaborating on its 
implications for judicial review. Is the control which the Court may exercise on the 
substance of the national policy choices not inherently limited (provided, that is, that 
such choices do not constitute an abuse of the rights which are acknowledged in 
Article 346 TFEU)?84 In the context of Article 347 TFEU, Advocate General Jacobs 
stressed the highly subjective nature of the assessment that national authorities are 
called upon to make and the corresponding paucity of judicially applicable criteria for 
the exercise of judicial control of high intensity. His argument is worth-citing in full 
 
... it is not for the Court to adjudicate on the substance of the dispute between Greece and 
FYROM. It is not for the Court to determine who is entitled to the name Macedonia, the star 
of Vergina and the heritage of Alexander the Great, or whether FYROM is seeking to 
misappropriate a part of Greece's national identity or whether FYROM has long-term designs 
on Greek territory or an immediate intention to go to war with Greece. What the Court must 
decide is whether in the light of all the circumstances, including the geopolitical and historical 
background, Greece could have had some basis for considering, from its own subjective point 
of view, that the strained relations between itself and FYROM could degenerate into armed 
conflict. I stress that the question must be judged from the point of view of the Member State 
concerned. Because of differences of geography and history each of the Member States has its 
own specific problems and preoccupations in the field of foreign and security policy. Each 
Member State is better placed than the Community institutions or the other Member States 
when it is a question of weighing up the dangers posed for it by the conduct of a third State. 
Security is, moreover, a matter of perception rather than hard fact. What one Member State 
perceives as an immediate threat to its external security may strike another Member State as 
relatively harmless. 
 
The interpretation of Article 346 TFEU is not the only issue relating to the notion of 
necessity which has attracted considerable attention recently. The other is the legal 
regulation of defence industries at EU level. The European Commission had 
advocated the use of EU law, along with other instruments, for the regulation of the 
defence industries since the mid1990s. After a series of initiatives assessing the 
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serious economic problems facing them,85 and advocating the adoption of a wide 
range of measures,86 the Commission put forward its so-called 'defence package' in 
December 2007, following which two specific measures have been adopted  by the 
Council, namely Directive 2009/43 on intra-EU transfers of defence products,87 and 
Directive 2009/81 on public procurement in the fields of defence and security.88 An 
analysis of these measures is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to point out 
that they aim to bring the benefits of the internal market to this sensitive area whilst 
acknowledging that the relevant products have special characteristics which may not 
be addressed by EU secondary legislation governing the movement and procurement 
of other, non-strategic goods. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This article discussed how the EU legal order accommodates the cases where Member 
States deem that the principle of necessity justifies a deviation from EU law. The 
analysis of the exceptional clauses in specific policy areas, both in primary and 
secondary law, as well as the wholly exceptional clauses in the EU Treaties, suggests 
that the wording and context of the relevant provisions acknowledge, rather than 
grant, the right of Member States to act in circumstances where they deem it 
necessary and in contravention of the EU rules. As the Union is based on the principle 
of limited competence, it would not have the power to grant Member States a right 
which is inherent in their existence as fully sovereign subjects of international law. 
Instead, EU law is focused on how to address the tensions which the exercise of this 
right may raise in the context of the Union's constitutional order.  
 
In seeking to ensure that reliance upon the notion of necessity is not abused, and that 
it complies with certain substantive and procedural requirements, EU law endows the 
courts with considerable powers. This becomes even more significant in the context 
of the decentralised judicial architecture of the Union, as the assessment of the 
balancing exercise articulated by the case-law of Court of Justice also involves 
national courts. Another aspect of this balancing exercise is its dynamic nature. The 
right of Member States to deviate from EU law in order to protect a certain social 
interest is examined against the extent to which this interest is already protected under 
EU law. Therefore, the dividing line between what is necessary for the national 
authorities to do and what is redundant in the light of an EU intervention in the area is 
subject to continuous redefinition.  
 
No area exemplifies this evolving process as clearly as the regulation of defence 
industries. The shift in the prevailing assumptions about the role of EU law in the 
area, the contribution of the Court of Justice, the gradual acceptance of the proper 
interpretation of Article 346 TFEU, the adoption of secondary legislation on intra-EU 
transfers and public procurement, all illustrate an incrementally developing legal and 
political environment. To strike the balance between what the Member States deem 
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necessary to do and what EU law requires them to do within this environment is not 
going to get easier.  
 
 
 
  
